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Abstract 
Agency theory has long been a stalwart of IS research and is one of the most commonly 
used lenses to study the relationship between a principal and an agent. The Theory of 
Relationship Constraints (TRC) has recently been recommended as an information-
oriented alternative to agency theory. TRC suggests that three attributes (i.e., the level 
of information asymmetry, levels of tacit and explicit knowledge) affect the perceived 
efficacy of a relationship constraint. As the first empirical test of TRC, this study uses 
scenario analysis to show that, as these attributes change, so do the constraints that are 
perceived as effective. No single constraint, as predicted, is perceived to be universally 
effective. Under certain conditions, social versus legal constraints have greater 
perceived efficacy, but this varies with the three attributes. This research provides 
support for TRC and suggests insights for future research and current practice. 
Keywords:  Theory of relationship constraints, agency theory, legal constraints, social constraints, IS 
consulting, empirical research, theory testing, scenario research  
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Introduction 
“…there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and 
distrust….” (James Madison, Federalist No 55) 
Opportunism, defined as self-interest seeking with guile, is rife within business (Williamson 1993b), and 
opportunistic individuals knowingly make promises that they do not intend to keep (Williamson 1975). 
Opportunism includes lying, cheating and stealing as well as “calculated effort to mislead, distort, 
disagree, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1975, p 47). Individuals engage in opportunism 
with an expectation that, as a result of their chicanery, they will gain an advantage over those who 
voluntarily comply with the rules (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). In the absence of opportunism, complex 
contracts and constraints are not needed because individuals and organizations can be counted upon to 
willingly disclose all relevant information in a timely manner. Opportunism reflects a basic human desire 
to triumph and the “ruthless selfishness” of successful genes (Dawkins 1967). Even inherently honest 
people might have a point in which the net benefits of opportunism are sufficient to induce opportunism 
(Williamson 1979). 
Information asymmetry, a critical antecedent to successful opportunism, occurs when one party has 
information that is needed by the other party. If both parties have fully symmetric information, either 
party can successfully enact controls that cancel out the benefits of the other being opportunistic. In the 
absence of a net advantage, opportunism is controlled (Miller 2003; Ramaswami et al. 1997; Richmond et 
al. 1992; Sharma 1997; Tan et al. 2003).   
Agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Kirsch 1997; Kirsch and Cummings 1996; Kirsch et al. 2002) argues that 
opportunism can be controlled by the development and enforcement of a contract that aligns the interests 
of the agent to those of the principal. Such contracts implicitly assume fully symmetric information and 
the ability of the contract to fully codify the information necessary to specify either the outcomes of the 
contract or the behaviors used in performing the contract (Kirsch 1997; Kirsch et al. 2002). However, 
these assumptions are doubtful when tacit knowledge or highly detailed explicit knowledge is used 
(Dawson et al. 2011). Indeed, tacit knowledge is not easily codified, whereas highly detailed explicit 
knowledge is so voluminous that contracts will necessarily be incomplete (Williamson 1975).  
The Theory of Relationship Constraints (TRC) has been proposed as an information-oriented revision of 
agency theory (Dawson et al. 2011). TRC considers the level and type of information that are used in a 
relationship, the level of information asymmetry, and the specificity of the contract in predicting the 
constraint mechanism that will be employed by parties in the relationship. As such, this is a policy 
capturing study that examines how decision makers use the information available to them when making 
evaluative judgments; in our case, selection of constraint mechanisms. As a new theory, TRC has not yet 
been subjected to rigorous empirical testing and this hinders its usefulness. The objective of this study is 
to examine the efficacy of TRC in predicting the choice of constraint mechanisms under a variety of 
conditions.  Specifically, we seek to understand if the level of information asymmetry, level of tacit 
knowledge, and level of explicit knowledge produce variation in the constraint mechanism that is 
perceived as most effective. If supported, TRC offers a valuable and timely update to agency theory and 
responds to calls to address its known shortcomings.  
This study uses the information systems (IS) consulting domain as the basis for testing the perceived 
efficacy of TRC in predicting the choice of constraint mechanisms. IS consulting falls into an oft-ignored 
“gray area” of IS research (Whinston and Geng 2004), which is surprising giving the size (USD 5b per 
year) and annual growth (8 percent) of the domain. Because IS consulting uses tacit and explicit 
knowledge and makes use of legal and social constraints, it is a hospitable environment to test TRC.  
In the next section, we review the relevant literature and use TRC to develop our proposition. Then, we 
present our method, followed by our analysis and findings. Last, we summarize our analysis, identify the 
limitations of our research and offer suggestions for future researchers.  
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Research Proposition Development  
Opportunism by IS Professionals 
Early economic views of man were homo economicus (fully rational) or homo psychologicus (boundedly 
rational) (Williamson 1993a). Consequently, opportunistic behavior was viewed as fixed and was often 
ignored to simplify managerial and economic analyses (Chen et al. 2002; Wathne and Heide 2000; 
Williamson 1993a). However, opportunism is now seen as being present in numerous relationships and is 
viewed as a variable that requires explanation rather than exclusion (Wathne and Heide 2000). 
Opportunism can either be active (lying) or passive (withholding relevant information), and opportunism 
is readily seen in a variety of disciplines. 
Professionals are expected to be able to control themselves from acting opportunistically, despite evidence 
(Dawson et al. 2011, Sharma 1997) that shows that professionals are as likely to be opportunistic as non-
professionals. Several definitions of professionals have been provided. For example, Barley (1996) argued 
that, to be considered a profession, an occupation had to be granted and maintain a relative monopoly 
over its theories and procedures. Other conceptualizations hold that professionals apply a specialized 
body of abstract knowledge to problem solving and share “a relatively permanent affiliation, identity, 
personal commitment, specific interests and general loyalties” with other professionals (Sharma, 1997, p. 
11). Professionals enjoy wide latitude in defining the nature of their work, the scope of the problems they 
address, and the style in which a problem is solved (Sharma 1997).  
We embrace the notion that IS consultants are professionals, for many reasons: first, they use a highly 
abstract body of knowledge to solve problems; second, they share a relatively permanent association with 
other IS consultants; third, they specify the scope and process of work to be performed; and last, their 
clients are able to make only a gross evaluation of the success of a project, particularly for more complex 
projects (e.g., an IS strategy document or a complex enterprise-wide financial or customer application). 
Like other professionals, some IS consulting work requires only a low level of knowledge (e.g. installing 
software requiring little customization) while other work is highly complex and demanding (e.g. 
implementing an ERP). Numerous examples of opportunism have been seen in IS consulting (Dawson et 
al. 2011).  
Constraining Opportunism 
The problem of opportunism is not new and society has developed legal and social mechanisms to 
constrain it. Legal constraints are enforceable through a court (Richman 2004), and businesses can head-
off many disputes by creating well-specified contracts. Social constraints are extralegal devices that exist 
outside of the rule of law but, in many cases, are even more powerful than legal constraints (Richman 
2004) (see Table 1). Social constraints are seen in highly divergent societies, including modern Jewish 
diamond merchants, nineteenth century California cattlemen, and eleventh-century rug merchants 
(Richman 2004). Social constraints evolved because of a recognition that people did not so much need 
contractual but transactional protection, and it is widely recognized that social constraints can 
supplement or be superior to legal constraints (Richman 2004). Opportunism cannot be fully constrained 
by outcome and behavior-based legal contracts, and society has created nuanced methods to constrain 
opportunism. Thus legal and social constraints are commonly witnessed in many relationships, including 
those of IS consulting (see Table 1). 
Table 1 – Legal and Social Constraints (Source: Dawson et al. 2011 and Sharma 1997) 
Social Constraints Legal Constraints 
Handshake agreements * – Commonly used for low 
risk agreements between parties who share a common 
bond. Characterized by a lack of documentation but 
close social bonding.  
Informal communities – Constraint is provided by a 
social group, which although lacking legal standing, has 
the ability to censor or “black ball” an opportunistic 
member of the community. This differs from Clan 
Firm fix price contracts (FFP) – Specifies 
the amount of work to be done and establishes 
a generally immovable price for the work. Are 
often outcome based and generally highly 
detailed and lengthy. 
Time and materials contracts (T&M) – 
Specifies the number of hours of work to be 
performed and the hourly rate to perform the 
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Control, which assumes no conflict of interest 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), while an informal community 
makes no such assumption. 
Formal communities – A formal body that can 
remove a person’s ability to practice. Only perceived to 
be effective if the practitioners agree to the authority of 
the formal organization.  
Third Party control – Contracting with a third party 
to provide additional support. 
Bureaucratic control – Appealing to the higher 
management of the person performing the work.  
Religious codes *– Guidance by religious texts that 
spell out appropriate behavior. Usually only perceived 
to be effective if both parties share a common religion. 
Self-control – Argues that humans should have the 
will power to resist opportunism.   
work. Are somewhat lengthy but not as lengthy 
as a FFP contract. 
Purchase order – Precisely specifies the 
product to be delivered, the means that it is to 
be delivered and the price for the 
product/service. Generally very concise. 
Incentive based contracts – Contracts that 
provide for some monetary incentive in terms 
of successfully performing the work and 
achieving certain milestones. 
* Handshake agreements and religious codes are infrequently used in modern business relationships.  
According to TRC, the choice of a constraint mechanism is contingent on several things, including the 
level of information asymmetry, the level of contract specificity, and the degree of tacit and explicit 
knowledge used for the engagement (Dawson et al. 2011). Thus, to understand the choice of constraint 
mechanism, we examine each predictor individually. 
Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a facilitating condition for opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000) since a lack 
of suitable information limits the disadvantaged party’s ability to detect (and ultimately deter) 
opportunistic acts (Kirmani and Akshay 2000). Without fear of detection, any opportunistically inclined 
individual can freely engage in deceit since there is little or no fear of being caught. Hence, the control of 
opportunism requires addressing and alleviating the problem of information asymmetry. 
Consider the purchase of software consulting services, where sellers (consultants) are generally thought to 
have an information asymmetry advantage because they know more about their ability to deliver the 
services than potential buyers. Because of their information asymmetry advantage, sellers can lie or omit 
key details about their delivery capabilities and can, by doing so, prey on the naivety of the buyer and 
induce the buyer to purchase low quality services. Buyers are aware of their information asymmetry 
disadvantage, but, lacking a way to reduce it, are often unable to distinguish between high and low quality 
consultants. High quality consultants are more expensive and, coupled with the buyer’s inability to 
distinguish quality and the buyer’s desire to pay the lowest price, high quality consultants are forced from 
the market, leaving only low quality consultants. As a result, if information asymmetry is not minimized 
or opportunism constrained (e.g., a warranty), the software market eventually deteriorates to having only 
low-quality consultants – a market of lemons (Akerlof 1970).  
The level of information asymmetry faced by the disadvantaged firm will determine its choice of 
constraint mechanisms (Dawson et al. 2011). If the level of information asymmetry is low, the 
disadvantaged firm is likely to implement a low cost or free constraint since it has sufficient salient 
information to avoid opportunism by the other party. However, if the level of information asymmetry is 
high, the disadvantaged firm should seek a more powerful constraint because of the potential high loss 
resulting if the other party is opportunistic.  
In both cases, we expect firms to balance the cost of constraints deployed against the foreseeable losses 
and to choose a constraint mechanism that best matches the level of existing information asymmetry. 
That is, a client should be expected to be boundedly rational in its choice of constraints and will perceive 
the most effective constraint to be one that best balances the risk that is faced in the deal with the cost of 
the constraint mechanism. As such, different constraint mechanisms would be chosen under varying 
levels of disadvantageous information asymmetry. In brief, in conditions of low information asymmetry, 
the client will select those constraint mechanisms that are the least costly to develop and administer. In 
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conditions of high information asymmetry, the client firm is forced to enact costlier constraint 
mechanisms. 
Contract Specificity 
TRC is a multi-part model. In the first part of the model, TRC proposes the use of signaling and screening 
to reduce the level of disadvantageous information asymmetry. In the second part, the levels of tacit and 
explicit knowledge determine the level of contract specificity. Finally, the level of contract specificity and 
the level of disadvantageous information asymmetry affect the choice of constraint mechanism. The 
authors point out that the relationship between signaling, screening and disadvantageous information 
asymmetry, because of their cyclic nature, should be tested with a process rather than variance model. 
Hence, we leave this set of relationships for other researchers to investigate. 
Although the levels of tacit and explicit knowledge are fully mediated by contract specificity, we focus on 
tacit and explicit knowledge, along with the level of disadvantageous information asymmetry in predicting 
the choice of constraint mechanisms. That is, we omit contract specificity (and contract completeness – its 
related concept) to focus on its antecedents to ensure that the type of knowledge is not obscured in this 
analysis. 
Types of Knowledge 
According to TRC, the type of knowledge used in a relationships is critical to the choice of constraint 
mechanism (Dawson et al. 2011). Knowledge can be bifurcated into explicit and tacit dimensions (Polanyi 
1967). Explicit knowledge can be easily captured, formalized and codified into documents, procedures, or 
databases and many people, with a modicum of effort, can learn explicit knowledge (Bassellier et al. 
2001). For example, it is relatively easy to learn the syntax of a programming language, and any aspiring 
programmer can generally remember it. While explicit knowledge is a necessary step to being able to 
successfully program, it is not the only step.  
To be a competent programmer requires acquiring and applying tacit knowledge, and it is only through 
practice that tacit knowledge can be gained. As such, tacit knowledge is viewed as the know-how that 
accompanies explicit knowledge (Bassellier and Benbasat 2004; Bassellier et al. 2003; Bassellier et al. 
2001). A programmer needs both explicit knowledge (the syntax) and tacit knowledge (experience in 
applying the syntax) in order to achieve programming prowess. 
The relationship between knowledge types and IS consulting work is well-established in the transaction 
cost economics (TCE) literature. According to TCE, human assets, which refer to the special knowledge 
held by IS consultants, have differing levels of specialized knowledge about the client. This client-specific 
knowledge refers to the degree that the consulting work requires a significant amount of understanding 
about the client’s unique work procedures, work processes, and in-place technologies. If the client has a 
large amount of these, the consultant will need to invest substantial time to understand them in order to 
be successful. Hence, client-specific knowledge is a significant predictor of the consultant’s ability to 
successfully deliver a project (Dibbern et al. 2008).  Table 2 provides examples of the types of tacit and 
explicit knowledge used in IS consulting. 
 Table 2 – Consulting Services Typology (Source: Dawson et al 2011) 
Explicit IS Knowledge  
High Low 
Tacit IS 
Knowledge 
High Very complicated projects.  
Implementation project: Complex 
enterprise-wide application 
spanning numerous divisions 
within an organization, which 
requires significant knowledge of 
systems development (explicit) 
and cognition (tacit). 
Strategy project: Development of 
Broad but not deep consulting projects. 
Classic domain of management 
consulting oriented projects. 
Implementation project: Data quality 
oriented projects that are more highly 
focused on process/people rather than 
technology, which requires low 
knowledge of technology (explicit) but 
significant experience (tacit). 
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an enterprise information 
security strategy, which requires 
significant knowledge of 
applications (explicit) and 
cognition (tacit). 
Strategy project: Sweeping strategy 
projects that encompass the entire 
organization but are not technology 
centric, which requires low knowledge 
of technology (explicit) but significant 
cognition (tacit). 
Low Deep but not broad consulting 
projects.  
Implementation project:  
Implementing security-based 
technology, such as a firewall, 
which requires high knowledge of 
applications (explicit) but low 
levels of cognition (tacit). 
Strategy project: Developing an 
upgrade plan for a current 
technology, which requires high 
knowledge of applications 
(explicit) but low levels of 
cognition (tacit). 
Simple projects 
Implementation project: Development 
of a basic spreadsheet application, 
which requires low knowledge of 
systems development (tacit) and low 
levels of experience (explicit). 
Strategy project: Development of a basic 
feasibility assessment for an 
uncomplicated application, which 
requires low knowledge of applications 
(tacit) and low levels of experience 
(explicit). 
 
TRC implicitly acknowledges that some level of tacit and explicit knowledge appears in every contract. 
That is, very rarely is there a complete absence of either knowledge type in any IS consulting project 
(Dawson et al. 2011). Even when a knowledge-type is low, it still exists and still requires an appropriate 
constraint. As a result, it is unlikely that any single constraint would fully accommodate both tacit and 
explicit knowledge and so buyers need to create the combination of constraint mechanisms that constrain 
both the level of tacit and explicit knowledge that is present in the engagement.  
Given that constraint mechanisms are believed to be differentially effective for certain circumstances, we 
suggest that clients will select the constraint mechanism that they believe to constrain opportunism in the 
least obtrusive and least costly way. We also argue that, over time, clients have developed an 
understanding of what constraints work best under these circumstances and that an experienced client 
will be able to identify and select the most effective constraint mechanism based on the levels of 
information asymmetry, tacit and explicit knowledge. Accordingly, our research proposition states that 
the perceived efficacy of a contraint mechanism will vary based on the levels of information asymmetry, 
tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Research Approach 
A scenario-based approach was used to examine the preceding proposition. Scenario-based research has a 
rich history within IS research, particularly when skilled judges are used (Banerjee et al. 1998), and is 
appropriate when seeking precision. This research is a policy capturing study that seeks to understand 
how respondents use available information to make evaluative judgments. We seek to understand the 
perceived effectiveness of each constraint under different levels of information asymmetry, tacit 
knowledge, and explicit knowledge. As such, each of our constraints is a dependent variable and our aim 
is to understand under what conditions a constraint is perceived to be effective.  
Three independent attributes were used to predict the type of constraint mechanism: the levels of explicit 
knowledge, tacit knowledge and client disadvantaged information asymmetry. We closely followed the 
definitions used in Dawson et al.  (2011) to operationalize each construct. We used their typology to 
identify IS consulting projects that have varying levels of tacit and explicit knowledge (see Table 2). In 
addition, we also used the typology to operationalize information asymmetry.  
For each attribute, we used a two-level predictor (high/low) for two reasons. First, our primary goal was 
to understand the importance of each attribute in predicting the perceived efficacy of each constraint 
mechanism and a two-level predictor provided sufficient insight. Second, the required number of 
scenarios increases substantially as the number of predictor levels rises. Using two-level predictors, we 
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were able to conduct the analysis with a total of eight scenarios, which results in a questionnaire that 
respondents can reasonably be asked to complete. Theoretically, we can identify eight (23) scenarios, but 
during the pilot phase (discussed later) learned that one was infeasible from a practical sense, so it was 
excluded from consideration during data collection. 
The dependent constructs (our constraint mechanisms) were measured using a five-point Likert scale in 
order to obtain a granular understanding of the perceived efficacy of each constraint for each scenario. We 
used three primary sources to identify the constraint mechanisms. First, we used those proposed in 
previous work on constraints on professionals (Sharma 1997). Among Sharma’s proposed constraints is 
the notion of self-control and it is easy to conceive self-control as trusting the other party to behave in a 
non-opportunistic fashion. As such, self-control differs from the other constraints but is still widely 
discussed in Sharma (1997) as a response in the face of opportunism. Second, we used constraint that 
surfaced in the development of TRC (Dawson et al. 2011). Finally we used some of the legal constraints 
that are commonly mentioned in agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989).  
We do not argue that these are the only possible constraint mechanisms that exist; there are additional 
ones (see Sappington (1991) for a summary). However, it was impractical to test for every possible 
constraint mechanism that could possibly work. We decided to focus on these eight constraints because 
they were the most commonly seen in IS literature and practice. 
In our instructions, we provided the respondent with a definition of each constraint mechanism (see Table 
3). Given that the target respondents were all highly experienced and likely did not require any 
explanation of each constraint type, we opted to provide only a brief definition of each constraint. Table 3 
also provides the source for the constraint mechanisms that we used.  
Table 3 - Constraint Definitions 
Constraint Definition Source 
Firm Fixed Price 
Contract  
A contract where a set amount of work is performed 
for a set price 
Eisenhardt (1989) 
Time and Materials 
Contract  
A contract where a client buys a certain number of 
hours of a consultant’s time 
Eisenhardt (1989) 
Purchase Order  A brief contract that specifies the product/service to 
be delivered and its cost 
Dawson et al (2011) 
Incentive Contracts  An addition to a contract that specifies a bonus for 
certain actions (e.g. faster delivery) 
Dawson et al (2011) 
Advisor Firm 
Participation  
The hiring of another consulting firm to help 
oversee the consultant 
Sharma (1997) 
Dawson et al (2011) 
Bureaucratic Control  The use of the consultant’s chain of command 
within his/her consulting firm 
Sharma (1997) 
Dawson et al (2011) 
Self Control  Reliance on a consultant’s personal ethics Sharma (1997) 
Dawson et al (2011) 
Informal Community  Reliance on the lead consultant’s desire to maintain 
his/her public reputation for integrity and honesty 
Dawson et al (2011) 
 
Scenario-based research is dependent on realistic scenarios that match the domain of interest, IS 
consulting in this case (see Table 2). We analyzed approximately 100 IS consulting contracts for their 
content, levels of tacit and explicit knowledge demanded (based on service types), and the extent of 
information asymmetry in order to select the ones to use for our scenarios. All of the contracts were 
gathered from the State of California, which has numerous contracting “vehicles” for different types of IS 
work. The public sector is generally required to list all of its procurements, which are available on a 
website maintained by the State of California’s procurement division. All State of California agencies are 
required to use these contracting vehicles and the Procurement Division for all IS-related work within the 
agency. We searched the Procurement Division’s website to find procurements that matched the typology 
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provided by Dawson et al (2011) (see Table 2). Using this, we were able to find projects with different 
levels of tacit and explicit knowledge. 
One of the tenants of TRC is that both the client and consultant have an information asymmetry 
advantage but the type of information is different. For example, the consultant will generally have an 
information asymmetry advantage about the process/technology to be used for the project while the client 
may have an information asymmetry advantage about the client firm’s acceptance of the new technology 
or project. Varying the consultant’s level of information asymmetry would substantially increase the 
number of necessary scenarios (from 8 to 16) and so we decided, as a scope narrowing approach, to 
stipulate that the consultant has a high information asymmetry advantage about the process/technology 
that would be used for the project. For each scenario, we stated (in the scenario) that the consultant was 
highly experienced with the project, which fixed the consultant’s advantaged level of information 
asymmetry as high. This allowed a sharper focus on different levels of client disadvantageous information 
asymmetry. 
Because the procurement documents were so lengthy (averaging 50-200 pages), it was necessary to 
summarize them in order to form the scenarios. We initially summarized each of the seven procurement 
documents into seven scenarios averaging 3-4 paragraphs in length. This use of actual projects increases 
the realism of the scenarios, which is a requirement for scenario-based research.  
We were not able to identify a procurement to meet one of our requirements: high information 
asymmetry, low tacit knowledge, and low explicit knowledge. As a result, we were forced to create a 
scenario that met these requirements. We sought to match the tone and level of detail from the other 
scenarios for this fabricated scenario. 
Pilot tests 
Once the scenarios were completed, we conducted a first pilot test with twelve respondents (i.e., IS 
consultants or clients known by the first author). The goal of the first pilot test was a manipulation check 
to see if the respondents correctly identified each scenario with the levels of tacit and explicit knowledge 
and information asymmetry. We provided a definition and description of all three attributes to the 
respondents, asked them to read the scenario and to provide an estimate of the level for each of the three 
attributes. The definitions that we provided were consistent with the definitions used in Dawson et al 
(2011). In addition, we asked the respondents to judge the level of realism of each scenario. 
The results from the first pilot test revealed several problems. In several of the scenarios, the levels of tacit 
and explicit knowledge were not clear and respondents did not correctly distinguish between high versus 
low levels of information asymmetry. All of the respondents judged the realism of the scenarios to be high, 
with the exception of the fabricated scenario. The respondents argued that they could not envision a case 
where the information asymmetry would be high (reflecting that the client would be very unfamiliar with 
the project) while the level of tacit and explicit knowledge is low (reflecting an easy project). Upon 
reflection, we agreed with this viewpoint and dropped the fabricated scenario. 
Finally, we discovered that the pilot survey took almost 30 minutes to complete and felt that most 
respondents would not complete a survey of such time duration. As a result, we shortened the scenarios to 
one or two paragraphs along with several bullet points highlighting the key facts.  
After these modifications, we sent the revised instrument to eight new pilot testers and asked them to 
identify the manipulation levels (levels of tacit/explicit knowledge, level of information asymmetry) and 
to judge the realism of each scenario. The results were encouraging. For each aspect of the manipulation 
check, we had a minimum of seven respondents who correctly categorized the attributes. We computed 
the probability of getting seven or more matches (respondents) out of eight, and eight out of eight using 
the binomial distribution assuming random selection (i.e., p= .5). The respective probabilities were .035 
and .004. With this empirical validation of the levels of the three attributes across the seven scenarios, we 
removed the manipulation check from the instrument and finalized it. Table 4 shows the subject of each of 
our scenarios as well as their respective levels of each attribute. Some representative examples of our final 
scenarios are shown in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 – Summary of Scenarios 
 Level of 
Scenario Info 
Asymmetry 
Explicit 
Knowledge 
Tacit 
Knowledge 
1 – Complex software development of a COTS 
financial system 
High High High 
2 – Assessment of disaster recovery readiness High Low High 
3 – Greening of a data center High High Low 
4 – Development of a complex secure electronic 
communications and information processing 
network 
Low High High 
5 – Developing and rolling out a new 
organizational structure 
Low Low High 
6 – Data center equipment installation Low High Low 
7 – Building microwave connectors Low Low Low 
Data collection 
We sent the instrument to 240 project managers (or people holding similar positions), from different 
industries, who were part of the first author’s LinkedIn contacts. A total of 50 people responded to our 
request to participate (20.8%) and completed the full instrument. As we used a scenarios approach, this 
study is more like an experiment than a survey, and as such the emphasis is on causality rather than 
generalizability (McGrath 1982). Respondents’ demographic information is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 – Respondents’ Demographic Information 
Element Mean 
Years of experience working with consultants 12.63  
Number of consultants supervised 77.90 
Average age 43 
Gender distribution Male: 38 
Female: 12 
Prior work experience All consulting: 12 
All client: 4 
Mix: 34 
 
We found no significant difference in the results based on any of the demographic information that was 
captured.  
Results 
The data set consists of eight dependent variables (the constraint choices) (Y) for the seven scenarios (S) 
and 50 respondents (R), and three treatments (information asymmetry (A), level of tacit (T) and explicit 
(E) knowledge) with levels of high and low. We use the R notation (Kabacoff 2009) to indicate models 
tested. MANOVA indicates that the different scenarios (Y ~ S) produced significantly different responses 
for the dependent variables (p < .0001), which is another form of manipulation check. We then conducted 
a MANOVA with the three treatments (Y ~ A*T*E) to test for treatment effects. Main effects were detected 
for each of the treatments and for interactions A*T, A*E and E*T (p < .0001).  Table 6 reports the means 
for each constraint within each scenario. 
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Table 6 – Means and MANOVA Analysis for perceived constraint effectiveness 
 Scenarios*   
Constraint 1 
HHH 
2 
HLH 
3 
HHL 
4 
LHH 
5 
LLH 
6 
LHL 
7 
LLL 
Overall 
Mean 
P-value 
Firm Fixed Price 
Contracts 
3.18 bc 3.58 b 3.69 ab 3.12 bc 3.39 b 3.38 b 3.12 b 3.37 < .0001  
Time and Materials 
Contracts 
2.80 c 2.98 c 3.02 c 3.60 a 3.43 b 3.52 b 3.57 a 3.30 < .0001  
Purchase Orders 2.50 c 2.77 c 3.23 c 2.94 c 2.78 c 2.96 c 3.22 ab 2.92 < .0001  
Incentive Contracts 3.64 ab 2.96 c 3.48 bc 3.20 b 3.45 b 3.96 a 3.24 ab 3.46 < .0001  
Advisor Firm 3.96 a 3.85 ab 3.33 bc 2.76 c 3.24 b 2.82 c 2.67 c 3.31 < .0001  
Bureaucratic 
Control 
3.52 b 3.60 b 3.40 bc 3.50 ab 3.78 b 3.56 ab 3.35 ab 3.57 < .0001  
Self Control 3.52 b 3.54 b 3.42 bc 3.58 ab 3.59 b 3.44 b 3.16 b 3.49 < .0001  
Informal 
Community 
3.92 a 4.23 a 4.00 a 3.58 ab 4.20 a 3.52 b 3.16 b 3.82 < .0001  
* The letters below each scenario reflect, in order, the levels of information asymmetry, explicit knowledge, and tacit knowledge 
present in that scenario.  The highest means for each scenario is bolded. 
Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different.  
 
MANOVA (Table 6) supports the proposition that the perceived effectiveness of constraint mechanism 
varies based on the levels of information asymmetry, and tacit and explicit knowledge. Given the 
significance of the MANOVA, we conducted a series of ANOVAs to better understand the conditions under 
which each constraint was perceived to be effective. That is, we were interested in knowing how 
significant information asymmetry, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are in predicting the 
perceived effectiveness of each constraint mechanism. We initially formulated the second MANOVA as (Y 
~ A*T*E + Error(R)), recognizing the repeated measures on each respondent, but the model is singular. 
For the individual ANOVAs, we run this repeated measures model. Our results (p-values) are shown in 
Table 7 and our discussion of perceived effectiveness of each constraint mechanism follows. 
 
Table 7 – Perceived Effectiveness of Constraint Mechanisms (p-values in cells) 
Constraint Information 
Asymmetry 
(A) 
Explicit Knowledge 
(E) 
Tacit Knowledge 
(T) 
A * E A * T E * T 
Firm Fixed 
Price 
Contracts  
.056 
 
.474 .283 .830 .043* .064 
Time and 
Materials 
Contracts 
< .0001* 
 
.978 .533 .382 .398 .428 
Purchase 
Orders 
.181 .954 < .0001* 
 
.707 .032* 
 
.108 
Incentive 
Contracts 
.384 .001* 
 
.802 .145 
 
.105 
 
.001* 
 
Advisor 
Firm 
< .0001* 
 
.056 < .0001* 
 
.456 
 
.103 
 
.013* 
 
Bureaucratic 
Control 
.581 .378 .027* 
 
.876 .732 .011* 
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Self Control .550 .724 .006* 
 
.650 .262 .165 
Informal 
Community 
< .0001* 
 
.023* < .0001* 
 
.689 < .0001* < .0001* 
 
* - Significant at p < .05 
 
Firm Fixed Price Contracts: There is an interaction effect between information asymmetry and tacit 
knowledge. In the presence of low tacit knowledge, the perceived effectiveness of a fixed price contract is 
higher when information asymmetry is high (see Table 8). 
Table 8 – Fixed Price Contract Interaction Means* 
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 
3.252b 3.260b Information Asymmetry 
High 3.673a 3.365ab 
 * Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different.  
 
We offer the following interpretation for this finding. A firm fixed price contracts limits the financial 
damage that could be done by an opportunistic consultant since it specifies a fixed amount for a set 
amount work.  When a project's required tacit knowledge is high, a firm has problems specifying 
outcomes and thus a precise contract. When tacit knowledge is low, a firm can be quite explicit about what 
should be performed. However, as information asymmetry increases, the client is increasingly unable to 
accurately project the cost of the effort.  By turning to a fixed price contract, it forces consultants to price 
the work competitively and effectively limits their ability to be opportunistic. 
Time and Materials Contracts: Only the information asymmetry factor is significant (p < .0001). Time 
and materials contracts are perceived as less effective as the level of information asymmetry rises (low 
mean = 3.561, high mean = 2.979).  If the level of information asymmetry is low, a client knows a great 
deal about the project and may be confident in its ability to spot and stymie a potentially opportunistic 
consultant. As a result, it is willing to assume more of the risk under a time and materials contract. 
However, as the level of information asymmetry rises, a client is likely to feel increasingly uncertain about 
its ability to stop an opportunistic consultant and this is why the perceived efficacy of a time and materials 
contract decreases with higher levels of information asymmetry. This suggests that the use of time and 
materials contracts will generally be confined to conditions of low information asymmetry.  
Purchase Orders: There is an interaction effect between information asymmetry and tacit knowledge such 
that in the presence of high information asymmetry, a purchase order is perceived as more effective when 
tacit knowledge is low (see Table 9). 
Table 9 – Purchase Order Interaction Means* 
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 3.108ab 2.884bc Information Asymmetry 
High 3.251a 2.680c 
* Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different.  
 
In many ways, a purchase order parallels a fixed price contract: it specifies the amount of work to be done 
and the price for that work to be done. Like with a fixed price contract, higher levels of tacit knowledge 
hinder the client’s ability to precisely and fully specify outcomes and thus limit its ability to create a 
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precise contract. Higher levels of information asymmetry further hinder this. A purchase order also limits 
the financial damage that can be done by an opportunistic consultant. So, when information asymmetry is 
high, a purchase order will be perceived to be more effective than when tacit knowledge is low. 
 
Incentive Contract: There is an interaction effect between tacit and explicit knowledge (see Table 10), 
such that in the presence of high explicit knowledge, an incentive contract is perceived as more effective 
when tacit knowledge is also high.  
Table 10 – Incentive Contract Interaction Means* 
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 3.353 ab 3.580 a Explicit Knowledge 
High 2.938 b 3.575 a 
* Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different.  
 
An incentive contract tries to set up conditions to encourage a consultant to work in a non-opportunistic 
fashion by making it financially beneficial to work in a way that is consistent with what the client wants. If 
set up properly, an incentive contract amplifies the incentives for working in the client’s interests and 
dampens the incentives to be opportunistic. An incentive contract does not place a substantial burden of 
knowledge on the client since it only requires the establishment of a limited number of incentives rather 
than a precise specification of outcomes or processes to be followed.  
 
Advisor Firm: There is an interaction effect between tacit and explicit knowledge, such that in the 
presence of low explicit knowledge, an advisor firm is perceived as more effective constraint when tacit 
knowledge is high (see Table 11).  
Table 11 – Advisor Firm Interaction Means* 
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 2.682 b 3.579 a Explicit Knowledge 
High 3.069 ab 3.375 ab 
* Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different. 
 
Advisor firm participation comes at a cost since the client has to hire a second consulting firm to oversee 
the work of the primary consulting firm. Since non-professionals (in our case, clients) do not have access 
to the tacit knowledge of the profession (Sharma 1997), high levels of tacit knowledge would seem to make 
advisor firm participation a worthwhile investment. By contrast, a client is capable, with diligent 
searching, of gathering all of the relevant explicit information and so high explicit knowledge is not likely 
to justify the incremental cost of an advisor firm. We posit that clients will only hire an advisor firm when 
they feel highly (or completely) incapable of overseeing the work. The interaction effect supports our 
positing.  
 
Bureaucratic Control: There is an interaction effect between the level of explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge such that in the presence of low tacit knowledge, bureaucratic control is perceived as more 
effective when explicit knowledge is high (see Table 12). 
Table 12 – Bureaucratic Control Interaction Means* 
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 3.346 b 3.484 ab Explicit Knowledge 
High 3.696 a 3.510 ab 
* Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different 
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Bureaucratic control seems to be a good general constraint that is perceived to be effective in a number of 
situations involving different levels of explicit and tacit knowledge. We suggest that this is because tacit 
knowledge requires some judgment and expertise to assess whether the lead consultant was 
opportunistic. Conversely, explicit knowledge is much easier to judge. However, if tacit knowledge is low, 
bureaucratic control is seen as more effective when explicit knowledge is high.  
Self Control: There is a single direct effect with the level of tacit knowledge (low mean = 3.34, high mean 
= 3.57) (p-value < .006). The perceived effectiveness of self-control rises as the level of tacit knowledge 
rises. We speculate that people may not feel that self-control is as effective when tacit knowledge is low, 
since clients can readily determine if a consultant is being opportunistic. As such, the perceived 
effectiveness of self control as a constraint rises when tacit knowledge increases, since it is more difficult 
to determine if a consultant is being opportunistic. Dawson et al. (2011) found difficulty with self-control 
as a constraint. In that study, self-control was mentioned as a constraint but numerous people doubted its 
ability to be effective. 
 
Informal Community: Informal community had the highest overall perception of effectiveness as a 
constraint and there are interaction effects between information asymmetry and tacit knowledge and 
between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge (Table 133). In the presence of low tacit knowledge, the 
informal community is perceived as more effective when information asymmetry is high. The interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge indicates that the informal community is judged more effective 
when explicit knowledge is high. 
 
Table 13 – Informal Community Interaction Means* 
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 3.343 b 3.900a a Information Asymmetry 
High 4.000 a 4.060 a 
    
  Tacit Knowledge 
  Low High 
Low 3.696 b 3.550 b Explicit Knowledge 
High 4.200 a 3.959 a 
* Means with the different alpha superscripts are significantly different. 
 
As the level of information asymmetry rises, the perceived efficacy of the informal community as a 
constraint rises and this is based on the idea that only a consultant is capable of understanding the actions 
of another consultant (Dawson et al. 2011). Hence, the consulting community effectively polices itself 
against opportunistic consultants. The second interaction effect suggests that it is easier to determine if a 
consultant has been opportunistic if the level of explicit information is high since it requires less 
judgment. Of all the constraints, the informal community had the highest overall perceived efficacy, 
although it is not perceived to be the most effective constraint in all scenarios. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Several major findings emerge from this research. First, as predicted by TRC, the perceived effectiveness 
of constraints varies significantly based on the levels of information asymmetry, explicit, and tacit 
knowledge. As a first empirical examination of TRC, this research provides evidence of the explanatory 
and predictive power of this theory.  
Second, no constraint is perceived to be universally effective. As shown in Table 6, no constraint is most 
effective in all situations; yet, every constraint is perceived to be effective in some situations. This suggests 
that opportunism can be constrained, but it is incumbent upon the client to choose the correct constraint 
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for each situation. A client has to correctly understand the situation (and its levels of information 
asymmetry, tacit and explicit knowledge) in order to choose an efficacious constraint.  
Third, generally speaking, social constraints are believed to be more efficacious than legal constraints 
when information asymmetry is high (scenarios 1, 2 and 3). This suggests that the IS consulting domain’s 
historical reliance on legal constraints is misplaced when information asymmetry is high. It also draws 
into question the predictive power of agency theory and its legal constraints when information asymmetry 
is high. 
Fourth, self-control, which is similar to the concept of trust (Sharma 1997), is believed to have very low 
effectiveness under most conditions. This suggests that self-control is simply ineffective and bolsters the 
argument for the need for other mechanisms to constraint opportunism. 
Fifth, for many constraints, the interaction between information asymmetry, explicit and tacit knowledge 
is salient and this eliminates the possibility of simply examining each attribute in isolation. While there 
are salient direct effects for most constraints, interaction effects are usually present. Successfully studying 
IS consulting constraints depends on examination of these interactions. 
Sixth, a constraint that was not envisioned by agency theory or the principal-professional lens, the 
informal community, was believed to be the single most effective constraint. This is particularly 
interesting since the informal community is a low cost constraint and simply requires an ability to tap into 
the informal community. Clearly, this constraint has significant promise but seems to be ignored in the 
literature, with the exception of TRC.  
Finally, the results are actionable and pragmatic for those in the IS consulting domain, as they will allow 
clients to better protect themselves from opportunistic consultants. Solving the problem of opportunism 
can be attacked in a number of ways. For example, a situation with high information asymmetry can be 
resolved with a variety of constraints (with different levels of perceived efficacy) or, potentially, can be 
resolved by shifting the project to only have low levels of information asymmetry (e.g., the client could 
hire an expert in a given technology). Client firms frequently view this as a strategic hire and it is 
specifically done to reduce the disadvantageous information asymmetry that faces the client firm. 
Like all studies, this one has its limitations. First, while we developed our short scenarios from lengthy 
procurement documents and tested their realism, we did not test whether respondents reacted identically 
to the complete document as compared to the précis of it used as a scenario. Second, this study uses a 
convenience sample of professional contacts of the first author. While this is a limitation, we believe that 
the high experience level of respondents mitigates this concern. Given the experiment-like nature of the 
scenario approach, we opted for strong internal validity and gained external validity through grounding 
the scenarios in actual projects and by seeking respondents practicing in the domain. We also 
acknowledge that we did not test for every possible constraint mechanism and focused on those frequently 
found in the IS literature and practice. Finally, we did not test the relative importance of each of our 
attributes in predicting the perceived effectiveness of each constraint mechanism. 
Future researchers can leverage this work and seek to understand what additional constraints exist and 
under what conditions each is perceived to work best. In addition, they can seek to extend generalizability 
of this study from the IS consulting domain into other domains. Finally, it is not clear what all the possible 
interactions between the constraint mechanisms are. That is, we did not attempt to undertake a study of 
the combinations of constraint mechanisms that work best in concert, although we suspect that there are 
combinations of constraints that work well together.  
Much like Akerlof (1970) describes in the Market for Lemons, opportunistic behavior, if unchecked, drives 
ethical, high quality service providers out of the market. Simply trusting that a partner will behave 
honorably is not sufficient. While high quality service providers currently remain in the IS consulting 
domain, literature is replete with examples of consultants behaving opportunistically. Most insightfully, 
some of the comments by clients in the original TRC paper (Dawson et al. 2011) show that most clients 
perceive a marketplace that is populated by opportunistic consultants. Consultants are seen as routinely 
engaging in opportunism and continually trying to deceive naïve clients. TRC, by focusing on information 
asymmetry as the root cause of opportunism, takes an information-oriented perspective. This study shows 
that TRC has promise to predict the interactions of information asymmetry and knowledge type in 
predicting the choice of constraint mechanisms. When faced with tight budgets and potentially 
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opportunistic consultants, clients have a limited amount of money to put into constraints and so must be 
judicious, yet effective, in the constraint mechanisms that they use. 
Similarly, high quality consultants should want effective constraints as these serve to ensure that 
opportunistic consultants do not prey on unsuspecting clients and that high quality work is recognized 
and rewarded.  To continue to keep IS consulting as a robust and viable domain of ethical service 
providers, finding ways to effectively constrain opportunism is key. This research’s findings provide an 
important step to understanding what clients can do to constrain opportunistic consultants and avoid IS 
consulting from becoming a market for lemons.  
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Appendix A – Example Scenarios 
Scenario 1 – Complex software development of a COTS financial system  
The organization (Client Firm) is undertaking a major effort that centers on the replacement of 70 current financial 
applications with a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) suite to include General 
Ledger, Accounts Receivable, Accounts Payable and Reporting functionality for a division of the organization. Client 
Firm, which has little idea about how to perform the work, has engaged Consulting Firm to perform this project.  
Key Facts: 
• The project is complex and large  
• The project requires a great deal of knowledge about technology and how to apply that technology 
• Client Firm knows very little about either the technology or how to approach the work 
• Consulting Firm know a great deal about the technology and how to approach the work 
• An advisor firm, which is precluded from performing the development work, is available, at a price, to help 
advise Client Firm 
 
Scenario 2 – Assessment of disaster recovery readiness  
Client Firm is a major bridge builder in the State of California and has been responsible for developing the 
engineering drawings that have been used to build major bridges within the State. These engineering drawings are 
useful to build the bridge but are also mandatory in the case of a seismic event (earthquake etc) that affects the 
bridge.  
The press has found out about Client Firm has never examined its disaster recovery readiness and headlines in local, 
regional, and national newspapers are calling it a dereliction of duty that this assessment has never been done. The 
State of California government has asked Client Firm to have Consulting Firm assess its readiness in the event of a 
seismic disaster. 
Key Facts: 
• The project is visible and important  
• The project requires very little knowledge about the specifics of any particular technology but does require a 
great deal of knowledge about the management of technology 
• Client Firm knows very little about how to approach the work 
• Consulting Firm know a great deal about how to approach the work 
• An advisor firm, which is precluded from performing the assessment work, is available, at a price, to help 
advise Client Firm 
 
